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Non-technical summary
This paper analyzes the behavior of the Federal Reserve (Fed) and the
European Central Bank (ECB) with respect to their interest rate decisions
from the beginning of 1999 until mid 2002. Since there was no common
monetary policy for the Euro area before 1999, we examine the average
central bank behavior of the countries forming the European Monetary
Union. To track the behavior of the two central banks we use Taylor-
type reaction functions which explain the interest rate behavior using the
inflation rate and the output gap as the main explanatory variables. We
compare the American with the European currency area by searching for
similarities and distinctions between the Taylor-type reaction functions of
the two central banks. Three main questions are of interest:
(i) Did the reaction function of the Fed and of the ECB (resp. Euro-Area)
change over the time period from 1995 to 2002?
(ii) Do the reaction functions show differences in the monetary policy
behavior of the Fed and the ECB?
(iii) Is there an interdependence between the reaction functions of the two
central banks?
We will estimate Taylor-type policy rules with data on a monthly basis for
the ECB and the Fed in order to find answers to these questions. Reaction
functions for the time before monetary union from 1995:1 to 1998:12 and
for the time from 1999:1 to 2002:8 are analyzed for the Euro area and for
the Fed. The reaction functions are compared between the two currency
areas and the two time periods. Furthermore, the usual reaction of the
interest rate to inflation and the output gap is complemented by additional
variables: money growth, exchange rate change and the interest rate of the
other currency area. The foreign interest rate is included because there
are reasons for a mutual influence like an implicit policy coordination or
an international transmission mechanism.
The estimations show that there are significant differences in the reaction
functions of both central banks before and after 1999 and between the two
central banks. Because of the limited data available the conclusions must
be treated with caution. Nonetheless, for the Euro one of the main findings
is a break in the interest rate reaction to inflation with the beginning of the
monetary union. Before monetary union, there is a strong reaction of the
average interest rate to inflation with a long-run coefficient that exceeds
unity. After January 1999 the coefficient falls below unity. Before 1999 we
find it difficult to track the behavior of the Fed with a Taylor-type reaction
function using our data. After 1999 the Fed seems to attach importance to
money growth in setting the interest rates. Our results also suggest that
the Fed’s policy has an impact on the Euro area policy, especially after
1999. On the other hand, the short-term interest rate of the Euro area is
not significant in the reaction function of the Fed.
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Abstract
This paper analyzes whether Taylor-type policy rules can be used to
describe the behavior of the Federal Reserve and the European Central
Bank from the beginning of 1999 until mid 2002. Since there was no
common monetary policy for the Euro area before 1999, we examine if
the average Central Bank behavior of the countries forming the European
Monetary Union can be approximated by a single reaction function.
We compare the currency areas by searching for similarities and dis-
tinctions between the Taylor-type reaction functions of the two central
banks. We pay particular attention to the possible influence of one
central bank on the behavior of the other one. The simplest method
to test this interdependence is to compare the two reaction functions
and try to incorporate the decision variable of one central bank into
the other central bank’s reaction function. The estimations show that
there are significant differences in the reaction functions of both central
banks before and after 1999 and between the two central banks. The
second result is that the Fed seems to influence the ECB but not vice versa.
JEL Classification: E58
Key Words: ECB, Federal Reserve, monetary policy, Taylor rule
1 Introduction
Based on the seminal article by Taylor (1993) there is still a growing re-
search in monetary policy rules. A lot of work has been done for the US
central bank and for the Euro area prior to monetary union. For the Euro
area, sometimes an artificial Euro area is generated, e.g. Gerlach (1999).
Typically, the existing literature on reaction functions focuses on one cen-
tral bank without taking into account influences on interest rate decisions
from abroad. But there are a few exceptions. Especially the leading role
of the Deutsche Bundesbank and its influence on interest rate decisions of
other central banks in Europe has attracted some attention (Bergin and
Jorda´ 2002). Also, Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998) incorporated the in-
terest rate decisions of the Federal Reserve (Fed) into the reaction function
of the Deutsche Bundesbank.
On the other hand, estimated reaction functions for the Fed usually only
include domestic economic variables. This may be due to the fact that
most of these articles were written before the common European monetary
policy was established. It may be the case that an influence of a single (or
several) European central banks on the Fed’s interest rate decision could
simply not be found. But now the currency areas of the US-Dollar and the
Euro are of comparable economic power, and the European Central Bank
(ECB) determines the monetary policy for the whole Euro area. Thus
there is no reason why the ECB’s policy should not influence the Fed’s
decisions and vice versa.
Until now a test of this hypothesis was not possible because of the un-
availability of sufficient data on the ECB policy. But in the meantime, the
time series needed for estimation of an ECB reaction function based on
monthly data seem to be long enough to produce reasonable results which
are accessible to a careful interpretation.
Three main questions are of interest:
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(i) Did the reaction function of the Fed and of the ECB (resp. Euro-Area)
change over the time period from 1995 to 2002?
(ii) Do the reaction functions show differences in the monetary policy
behavior of the Fed and the ECB?
(iii) Is there an interdependence between the reaction functions of the two
central banks?
We will estimate Taylor-type policy rules for the ECB and the Fed in order
to find answers to these questions. As a straightforward approach to search
for a mutual impact on monetary policy, we will incorporate the decision
variable of one central bank into the other central bank’s reaction function
and test its significance. In order to increase the length of the ECB time
series, we will use an average interest rate of the countries forming the
monetary union before 1999.
This paper is organized as follows. The second section presents some Taylor
rule specifications and discusses estimation problems. The third section is
an outline of the basic estimation equations followed by the description
of the data. The fourth section contains the main results and possible
explanations for the findings while the fifth section concludes.
2 Taylor type rules
A monetary policy reaction function describes how a central bank sets its
policy instrument in response to the economic circumstances. The Taylor
rule as a special reaction function is characterized by the response of the
interest rate to inflation and the real output gap. Taylor (1993, p.202)
assumes the following equation:
i∗ = pi + 0.5y¯ + 0.5(pi − 2) + 2 (1)
with i∗ - short term interest rate
pi - rate of inflation over the previous four quarters
y¯ - percent deviation of real GDP from a target.
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The target inflation rate pi∗ is assumed to be 2 percent and the equilibrium
real interest rate is attributed to be 2 percent. The current inflation rate
is used as a proxy for the expected inflation.
Here, a Taylor-type rule is not a commitment of a central bank to a strategy
but a description how a central bank sets its instrument in absence of an
explicit instrument or targeting rule, the latter proposed for instance by
Svensson (2002). Most of the time, the basic Taylor rule gives a surprisingly
good description of the behavior of the interest rate. For the examined
currency areas figure 1 and 2 show how well the Taylor rule tracks the
course of the appropriate interest rate.
Please insert figure 1 and 2 here.
For the Euro area the interest rate resulting from the Taylor rule and
the short-term interest rate used in the analysis have a similar movement
despite a difference in the level until 1999.1 After 1999, the interest rate
from the Taylor rule tracks the short-term interest rate not so well anymore.
For the US the picture is reversed. Here the track is better after 1999. This
is confirmed by the estimations following in the next chapter.
Because a reaction function like this is more or less a rule of thumb, there
is no consensus for the appropriate specification of the function. So there
are a lot of specifications concerning interest rate smoothing and short-run
dynamics of the interest rate, backward- and forward-looking specifications
with respective lags and the determination of the measures of inflation and
output gap. In the following different specifications are described.
The standard Taylor rule describes the setting of the target interest rate
depending on the price gap and the output gap. The respective weights
can be estimated by an equation derived from the basic Taylor rule like:
i∗ = γy¯ + (1 + δ)pi − δpi∗ + r
= α + βpi + γy¯ (2)
1The difference in the level can arise because of the real interest rate being different than 2 per cent
for this time period.
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with α ≡ r− δpi∗ and β ≡ 1 + δ. So the constant contains the real interest
rate and the weighted target inflation rate.
To capture the short-term dynamics of the interest rate we include the
lagged interest rate in the equation. There are different explanations for
interest rate smoothing (Goodfriend 1990). One possibility is to assume
that a central bank is averse to large interest rate movements. Therefore,
the interest rate is determined by weighting the interest rate target of the
Taylor rule and the lagged interest rate:
it = ρit−1 + (1− ρ)i
∗
t + εt. (3)
Equation 3 is the basis for expanding the number of explanatory vari-
ables and changing their time index. Depending on the time index of
the variables, often lagged explanatory variables are associated with a
backward-looking specification, future and contemporaneous variables with
a forward-looking specification. The timing of the variables also has an
influence on the interpretation of the reaction function. If the variables
are predetermined, the Taylor-type rule is an explicit reaction function
whereas if the variables are forward-looking it is an implicit reaction func-
tion (Svensson 2002).
Besides inflation and output gap, additional variables can be included into
the estimation equation, for instance lagged inflation, money growth, for-
eign interest rates or real exchange rates (Clarida et al. 1998 or Gerlach
and Schnabel 1999). In open economies, the best way to achieve price sta-
bility is by targeting ”long-run inflation” - a measure of inflation adjusted
to remove transitory effects of exchange-rate movements (Ball 2000). But
especially the U.S. is not an open economy. The exports of goods and ser-
vices amount to 10.3 percent of the GDP and the imports to 13.7 percent
in 2001 (European Commission 2002, p. 90). For the Euro area, the fig-
ures are comparable and amount to 15.5 percent for the exports and 14.8
percent for the imports (computations based on data from the European
Central Bank 2003, p. 52,75). However, a term capturing exchange rate
effects are included in both estimation equations.
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The first pillar of the ECB’s monetary policy framework is the money
growth. As the ECB puts it ”Inflation is ultimately a monetary phe-
nomenon” (European Central Bank 1999, p. 47). So we add money growth
as an explanatory variable. To compare the results a money growth vari-
able is also added to the equation of the Fed.
One focus is to examine a possible interdependence between the reaction
functions of the Euro area and the Fed. This will be done by incorporating
the interest rate of the other currency area in the estimation as in Greiber
and Herz (2000). This will give a first hint whether there is a possible
interdependence between the interest rate fixing in the two currency areas.
A backward-looking specification looks like (e.g. Kozicki 1999 or Nelson
2000):
i∗t = α + βpit−n + γy¯t−n + δxt−n (4)
it =
(
1−
N∑
i=1
ρi
)
i∗t +
N∑
i=1
ρiit−i + εt. (5)
To simplify the notation all additional variables other than inflation and
output gap will be indicated by x in the following specifications of Taylor-
type rules.
An alternative approach to capture the short-term behavior of the interest
rate is to assume an error-correction model similar to Judd and Rudebusch
(1998). Here the difference between the actual interest rate and the interest
rate resulting from the Taylor rule is closed by an adjustment process of
the interest rate. But we exclude the second output gap term of Judd and
Rudebusch and allow for lagged values in the i∗-equation:
∆it = ρ[it−i − i
∗
t ] + ζ∆it−i + ηt
= ρ[it−i − α− βpit−i − γy˜t−i − δxt−i] + ζ∆it−i + ηt (6)
Because the transmission of monetary policy takes time a central bank
should react to inflation and output gap in the future. This behavior
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will be captured by forward-looking Taylor-type rules (e.g. Gerlach and
Schnabel 1999 or Clarida et al. 1998)
i∗t = α + βEtpit+n + γEty¯t+n + δEtxt+n (7)
it =
N∑
i=1
ρiit−i +
(
1−
N∑
i=1
ρi
)
[α + βEtpit+n + γEty¯t+n + δEtxt+n] + εt
=
N∑
i=1
ρiit−i +
(
1−
N∑
i=1
ρi
)
[α + βEtpit+n + βpit+n − βpit+n
+γEty¯t+n + γy¯t+n − γy¯t+n + δEtxt+n + δxt+n − δxt+n] + εt
=
N∑
i=1
ρiit−i +
(
1−
N∑
i=1
ρi
)
[α + βpit+n + γy¯t+n + δxt+n] + νt (8)
with νt = εt + (1− ρ)[βu
pi
t+n + γu
y
t+n + δu
x
t+n]
upit+n = Etpit+n − pit+n
uyt+n = Ety¯t+n − yt+n
uxt+n = Etxt+n − xt+n
and Et expectations at the beginning of period t, or with alternative short-
run dynamics
∆it = a0 + ρ[it−m − i
∗
t ] + ζ∆it−i + ηt
= ρ[it−m − α− βpit+n − γy¯t+n − δxt+n] + ζ∆it−i + ηt (9)
A Taylor-type rule with contemporaneous inflation and output gap can be
treated as a special case of a forward-looking Taylor-type reaction function
with n = 0 and is estimated e.g. in Orphanides (2001). If the central bank
determines the interest rate at the beginning of the time period, current
inflation and output gap are not known but have to be forecasted.
Special problems arise for the forward-looking specification of the Taylor-
type rule because of measurement errors in the variables. Especially the
output gap is affected by revisions. Therefore 2SLS is used for the esti-
mation. The instrument list includes a constant and lagged interest rate,
inflation rate, output gap, term structure and exchange rate change. Ad-
ditionally, in equations containing money growth and the foreign interest
rate the respective lagged series are incorporated.
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When the estimated reaction function is backward-looking and only con-
tains lagged variables, there is no problem of endogenous variables. The
second problem arises if the contemporaneous interest rate of the other
area is included in a forward-looking specification of the estimation equa-
tion because there could be a simultaneity problem. If simultaneity applies
both equations have to be estimated jointly in a system. But a Hausman
specification test assures that there is no problem when estimating both
equations separately (see appendix A.1 for the test results).
3 The Data
A lot of studies use quarterly data but the decision making of the central
banks takes place more often. So monthly data will be used in this analysis.
All series but interest rates are seasonally adjusted and are available for
the period from January 1994 to July 2002. Since the estimation period
starts before the monetary union, it is assumed that for this time period
an artificial Euro area is analyzed. This is not uncommon in the literature
(e.g. Gerlach and Schnabel 1999).
The three main variables for every currency area are (i) a short-term inter-
est rate, (ii) inflation based on a consumer price index and (iii) the output
gap (for further description and data sources see appendix A.2).
The appropriate interest rate is the instrument of the central bank used
for monetary policy. Both central banks operate in the money market, but
they can only influence the interest rate on the overnight money market
directly, not the longer-term interest rates of the money market (Borio
2001). The latter can be influenced over the expectations about the future
overnight rate (signalling). The Federal Reserve announces an objective
for the federal funds rate, the federal funds target. Therefore the federal
funds rate as the operating target is used for estimation (Bru¨ggemann and
Thornton 2002). For the European Central Bank the instrument is not
that clear. Here the signalling takes place through the interest rates of the
main refinancing operations. So the operating target is the Euro Overnight
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Index Average (EONIA) and is therefore used for estimation. Before 1999
the EONIA is replaced by the weighted interbank deposit bid rates.
The ECB has explicitly announced that the inflation of the harmonized
consumer price index (HCPI) is the objective for achieving price stability.
Therefore this index is used for calculation of the year-to-year inflation rate
in percentage points
pit = 100[log(CPIt)− log(CPIt−12)].
The same calculation is used for the US inflation rate but with the core
consumer price index (less food and energy) as a basis. The Fed has no ex-
plicit price index announced to fight inflation. Judd and Rudebusch (1998)
compare Taylor-type reaction functions, where the inflation rates are based
on different price indices. They come to the conclusion that the estimation
is not very sensitive with regard to different measures of inflation. Kozicki
(1999) comes to the opposite conclusion that the recommendations given
by the Taylor rule are not robust to the specification of the inflation and
output gap measures. However, we have picked one index and use the core
consumer price index in the following regressions.
For the US the rate of the capacity utilization of the US business survey
approximates the output gap. For the Euro area there is no similar time
series available on a monthly basis. Therefore the output gap is calculated
from the industrial production (IP):
y¯t = 100[log(IPt)− log(IP
∗)]
with IP ∗ as potential output. The series for potential output is calculated
from the series of saisonal adjusted industrial production using a Hodrick-
Prescott-Filter.
In the extended estimations annual money growth of M3 for the Euro
area, annual money growth of M2 for the US and annual real effective
exchange rate change for both currency areas are used in addition to in-
flation and output gap. For the Euro area, M3 is chosen because of its
three-month moving average is explicitly announced as the first pillar of
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the ECB strategy. In the U.S. the focus is rather on the monetary aggregate
M2 (Pakko 1995).
There is a problem with the use of contemporaneous inflation and output
gap using historical and therefore revised data. Doing this, one assumes
more knowledge about the state of the economy by the central bank than
it had at the time of the decisions. Therefore Orphanides (2001) opts for
real-time data. But there are no real time data available for the ECB and
for the US only with a considerable time lag. Therefore revised data will
be used for estimation.
Most of the literature on the estimation of Taylor-type reaction functions
does not pay much attention to the properties of the time series. Station-
arity of the series is rather assumed than tested (see Florens et al. 2001, p.
4). If we test the time series used in the regressions the resulting picture is
mixed (for the tests see appendix). For the interest rate of the Euro area
(USA), stationarity is rejected at the 5 (10) percent level. Stationarity for
the European inflation rate cannot be rejected, but for the US inflation it
is. The ADF-test rejects non-stationarity for the output gap of the Euro
area, but for the output gap of the US stationarity is rejected. For the
change rate of the exchange rate stationarity cannot be rejected for both
currency areas. The same is true for the European money growth. But
stationarity is rejected for money growth of the US at the 10 percent level.
So some of the time series appear to be non-stationary. Therefore the
estimation is carried out with the alternative dynamics (equation 6 resp.
9) because this approach resembles an error-correction formulation of the
equation in question. Nonetheless, if we use the level specification of the
estimation equations the long-run coefficients do not change in a significant
way.
4 Estimation Results
The estimation period contains the time period from January 1995 to June
2002. With the introduction of the Euro and the start of a single monetary
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policy in Europe in January 1999 there could be a structural break in the
conduct of the monetary authorities. This is confirmed by a test and
therefore we will use dummy variables to capture the effect of changing
parameters in the backward-looking equations. Also for the US a change
in the instrument setting of the central bank seems to have taken place so
in these equations the appropriate dummy variables will be used too. For
equations containing the contemporaneous inflation rate, output gap, and
additional variables the estimation period is divided in January 1999.
Before 1999 no common monetary institution was responsible for the mon-
etary policy of the Euro area. Therefore it is impossible to estimate a
reaction function of a common central bank. On the other hand, the con-
vergence criteria forced the national central banks to keep inflation at a
low level. Therefore we will assume that we can explain the behavior of
the average interest rate as dependent on Euro-wide economic variables
and thus estimable with a Taylor-type reaction function. For a similar
investigation using quarterly data see Gerlach and Schnabel (1999).
Especially for forward-looking reaction functions other possible specifica-
tions can be imagined. Florens et al. (2001) use an estimation equation
leading the inflation 12 months and lagging the output gap one month,
Orphanides (2002) uses different leads for inflation and the same leads for
the output gap, Clarida et al. (1998) lead inflation 12 months and use the
contemporaneous output gap, Clausen and Hayo (2002) use contempora-
neous variables. We find that the contemporaneous inclusion of inflation
and output gap gives the only reasonable estimation results for the data
available.
The following specification for estimating the equations is used (for the
estimation results see appendix A.4):
∆it = a0 + a1it−n + a2pit+n + a3y¯t+n + a4xt+n + a5∆it−1 + ηt, n = {−1, 0}.
Therefore the long-run reaction coefficients of inflation, output gap and
the alternative variable are calculated from the estimated parameters as
−ai/a1, i = 2, .., 5 and collected in table 1 and 2, each for lagged and for
contemporaneous explanatory variables for the ECB and the Fed. When
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Table 1: Long-run coefficients of Taylor-type rules 1995 - 1998
EMU U.S.
x const. it−1 pit−1 y¯t−1 xt−1 const. it−1 pit−1 y¯t−1 xt−1
- 1.40 0.22 1.61* 0.44* - -40.28* 0.18 0.24 0.54* -
∆e 1.45* 0.22* 1.59* 0.43* 0.004 -43.01* 0.19 0.58 0.57* 0.02
∆M 3.28* 0.31* 1.43* 0.26* -0.33* 2.14 0.25 -0.95 0.08 -0.26*
i# -4.77 0.32* 1.32* 0.21 1.23* -22.21 0.27 -0.52 0.33* 0.29
x const. it−1 pi y¯ x const. it−1 pi y¯ x
- 1.97* 0.23* 1.25* 0.29* - -36.27* 0.14 0.25 0.49* -
∆e 1.97* 0.23 1.25* 0.29* 0.001 -32.93* 0.19 1.32* 0.42* 0.10*
∆M 3.42* 0.25* 1.27* 0.24* -0.314 4.545 0.16 -1.00 0.05 -0.30
i# -4.21 0.27* 0.97* 0.08 1.225 -25.19 0.17 -0.20 0.36* 0.17
* Underlying parameters in the estimation equation are significant at the 5 percent level.
Table 2: Long-run coefficients of Taylor-type rules 1999 - 2002
EMU U.S.
x const. it−1 pit−1 y¯t−1 xt−1 const. it−1 pit−1 y¯t−1 xt−1
- 3.45* 0.15 0.04 0.60* - -51.40* 0.15* 1.38 0.67* -
∆e 2.42 0.05 -0.24 0.61 -0.47* -49.78* 0.18* 1.07 0.65* 0.04
∆M 4.28* 0.25 0.44 0.30* -0.28* -38.85* 0.26* 1.19* 0.54* -0.34*
i# 0.97 0.22* 0.65* 0.22 0.29* -48.52* 0.18 0.95 0.63* 0.18
x const. it−1 pi y¯ x const. it−1 pi y¯ x
- 2.96* 0.19* 0.25 0.63* - -55.77* 0.15* 2.25* 0.70* -
∆e 2.62 0.13 0.30 0.60* -0.08* -50.28* 0.19* 1.34 0.65* 0.09
∆M 3.90* 0.27* 0.65* 0.26* -0.28* -42.16* 0.20* 1.68* 0.58* -0.41*
i# 1.40 0.22* 0.61* 0.37* 0.20* -48.09* 0.21* 0.79 0.62* 0.52
* Underlying parameters in the estimation equation are significant at the 5 percent level.
the parameters which underlie the long-run coefficients are significant at
the 5 percent level, they are marked by an asterisk. To test the significance
of the cointegration relationship represented by the coefficient of the lagged
interest rate the critical values of Banerjee et al. (1998, p. 276-277) are
used.
Estimation period: 1995:1 - 1998:12 For the period from January 1995 to
December 1998, it seems that the average interest rates in the later Euro
area is tracked reasonably well by a Taylor type rule. This is not true for
the Fed.
11
For the later Euro area the weight on inflation exceeds unity, except for
the equation including the contemporaneous federal funds rate. The weight
on the lagged interest rate is relatively low, indicating a slow adjustment
process. The coefficient of the output gap is significant and displays values
between 0.24 and 0.44. For the additional variables, only lagged money
growth and the lagged federal funds rate are significant. The value for
money growth is negative. This confirms the results of Begg et al. for
the ECB (2002) that even for the time before the ECB, interest rates cuts
are carried out if money growth is strong. This is counterintuitive: one
expects increasing interest rates if money growth is strong. The long-run
coefficient of the funds rate seems to be unreasonably high with a value of
1.2. If the federal funds rate is significant in the reaction function of the
ECB, it has a positive impact on the short-term interest rate but it renders
the output gap and the constant insignificant.
The results for the Fed are quite different. In all equations the cointegra-
tion relationship is not significant. Furthermore, the only equation that
shows a significant coefficient with the expected sign for the inflation rate
is the one with the contemporaneous exchange rate change as additional
variable: The inflation has a coefficient exceeding one and the output gap
has a coefficient of 0.4. For all other equations the parameters are rela-
tively unstable because most of the long-run coefficients do not have the
expected size, or even sign and the underlying parameters are not signifi-
cant. This result differs strongly from Judd and Rudebusch (1998, pp. 9
and 14). They report a coefficient for inflation that exceed unity for the
time from 1987:4 to 1997:4. The low value for the constant in the reaction
function of the Fed in comparison to the ECB results from a different spec-
ification of the output gap. In contrast to the Euro area where the output
gap fluctuates around zero the U.S. output gap is defined as the capacity
utilization with a full utilization around 80 percent. So the expected value
of the output gap is included in the constant.
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Estimation period: 1999:1 - 2002:8 For the second estimation period the
picture is reversed. Here a Taylor-type rule tracks the behavior of the Fed
better than the behavior of the ECB.
For the ECB, the weight on inflation is lower than unity for all estimated
equations. Most of the underlying parameters are not significant at the
5 percent level. A long-run coefficient lower than unity could indicate
a destabilizing monetary policy. But the reaction function used here is
not conditioned on shocks like demand or technology shocks but on the
variables themselves. The use of a reaction function not conditioned on
shocks can result in a coefficient smaller than unity depending on the ratio
of inflation variance caused by demand to inflation variance caused by
technology (Giannone, Reichlin, and Sala 2002, p. 11). A small value of
this ratio leads to a small coefficient. Again, the weight on the lagged
interest rate is relatively low indicating a slow adjustment process. The
output gap is significant most of the time and the long-run coefficient is
lower than one, as expected. For this time period the alternative variables
are more important than before. There is a significant negative reaction
to the exchange rate change and the money growth. Here, the influence of
the federal funds rate is much smaller but still significant.
As in the preceding estimation period the results for the U.S. are differ-
ent in comparison to the ECB reaction functions as well as in comparison
to the reaction function of the Fed before 1999. If the parameter of the
inflation rate is significant, long-run run stability requires a long-run co-
efficient of inflation exceeding unity. Again the output gap plays a major
role. Its parameters are significant in all estimated specification. From the
additional variables only money growth seems to influence the setting of
the interest rate by the Fed. Again, we notice a low constant and a slow
adjustment process caused by the small coefficient of the lagged interest
rate.
Summing up, we find a structural break in the reaction function for both
currency areas and a reversal in the goodness of fit before and after the
break. On the other hand we find a small adjustment coefficient for both
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curreny areas. Mostly, this is associated with interest rate smoothing
or monetary policy inertia. For monthly data, smoothing is well known
(Rudebusch 2002). The output gap plays a major role in both reaction
functions. The reaction to the output gap is similar across currency areas
and time periods.
For the Euro area, there seems to be a considerable change in the reaction
of the interest rate to inflation. Before monetary union and in the process
of fulfilling the convergence criteria, the estimation confirms the expected
reaction to inflation. Other variables play a rather minor role, especially
if we assume forward-looking behavior by contemporaneous inclusion of
the variables. Inflation loses its major role in the reaction function after
monetary union. Instead, the relative importance of the output gap and of
other variables like money growth, exchange rate and the foreign interest
rate increases.
The Fed’s reaction function also displays a different behavior before and
after 1999. Here, the change does not concern the reaction of the interest
rate to inflation but rather the additional variables. Before January 1999,
the Fed reacted rather to the exchange rate change, while it reacted to
money growth after January 1999.
Our results suggest a rather one-sided relation between the monetary policy
in the two currency areas. The short-term interest rate of the Euro area is
not significant in the reaction function of the Fed whereas the federal funds
rate is significant in the reaction function of the ECB especially from 1999
on. However, this result has to be treated very cautiously. Bergin and
Jorda´ (2002, p. 11) also find a significant effect of the German monetary
policy on the Fed disappearing in a deeper analysis separating timing and
direction of monetary policy interdependence.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we estimated Taylor-type reaction functions of the Federal
Reserve and the European Central Bank with data on monthly basis. Re-
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action function for the time before monetary union from 1995:1 to 1998:12
and for the time from 1999:1 to 2002:8 are analyzed for the Euro area and
for the Fed. The reaction functions are compared between the two cur-
rency areas and the two time periods. Furthermore, the usual reaction of
the interest rate to inflation and the output gap is complemented by addi-
tional variables: money growth, exchange rate change and the interest rate
of the other currency area. The foreign interest rate is included because
there are reasons for a mutual influence like an implicit policy coordination
or an international transmission mechanism.
Because of the limited data available the conclusions must be treated with
caution. Nonetheless, for the Euro area one of the main findings is a break
in the interest rate reaction to inflation with the beginning of the monetary
union. Before monetary union, there is a strong reaction of the average
interest rate to inflation with a long-run coefficient that exceeds unity.
After January 1999 the coefficient falls below unity. Before 1999 we find
it difficult to track the behavior of the Fed with a Taylor-type reaction
function using our data. After 1999 the Fed seems to attach importance
to money growth in setting the interest rates.
Our results also suggest that the Fed’s policy has an impact on the Euro
area policy, especially after 1999. On the other hand, the short-term inter-
est rate of the Euro area is not significant in the reaction function of the
Fed.
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A Appendix
A.1 Hausman specification test
Simultaneity between the two reaction functions can potentially occur if
the unlagged interest rates of the currency areas are mutually included
in their respective reaction function. If simultaneity can be found, the
endogenity of the regressors requires an IV estimator for unbiased results.
To test for simultaneity we use a Hausman specification test that analyzes
if the regressor is correlated with the error term. The starting point are
the two Taylor type reaction function for the U.S. and the Euro area:
iemt = ρi
em
t−1 + (1− ρ)α + (1− ρ)βpi
em
t
+ (1− ρ)γy¯emt + (1− ρ)δi
us
t + ν
em
t (10)
iust = ρ
∗iust−1 + (1− ρ
∗)α∗ + (1− ρ∗)β∗piust
+ (1− ρ∗)γ∗y¯ust + (1− ρ
∗)δ∗iemt + ν
us
t (11)
Due to symmetry, only the reaction function of the ECB is analyzed:
iemt = ρi
em
t−1 + (1− ρ)α + (1− ρ)βpi
em
t + (1− ρ)γy¯
em
t + (1− ρ)δ[ρ
∗iust−1
+(1− ρ∗)α∗ + (1− ρ∗)β∗piust + (1− ρ
∗)γ∗y¯ust + (1− ρ
∗)δ∗iemt
+νust ] + ν
em
t
= a0i
em
t−1 + a1 + a2pi
em
t + a3y¯
em
t + a4[b0i
us
t−1 + b1 + b2pi
us
t + b3y¯
us
t
+b4i
em
t + ν
us
t ] + ν
em
t
iemt =
a0
1− b4
iemt−1 +
a1
1− b4
+
a2
1− b4
piemt +
a3
1− b4
y¯emt +
a4b0
1− b4
iust−1 +
a4b1
1− b4
+
a4b2
1− b4
piust +
a4b3
1− b4
y¯ust + a4ν
us
t + ν
em
t (12)
iust =
b0
1− a4
iust−1 +
b1
1− a4
+
b2
1− a4
piust +
b3
1− a4
y¯ust +
b4a0
1− a4
iemt−1 +
b4a1
1− a4
+
b4a2
1− a4
piemt +
b4a3
1− a4
y¯emt + b4ν
em
t + ν
us
t (13)
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The estimation of equation 12 results in fitted values of the interest rate
iˆemt , used in equation 11:
iust = ρ
∗iust−1 + (1− ρ
∗)α∗ + (1− ρ∗)β∗piust + (1− ρ
∗)γ∗y¯ust (14)
+(1− ρ∗)δ∗iˆemt + (1− ρ
∗)δ∗νˆemt + ν
us
t (15)
H0 (no simultaneity): no correlation between νˆ
em
t and ν
us
t
For an efficient estimation the actual and not fitted values of the interest
rate are used.
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
dependent variable iem ius
constant -4.49 -4.71 constant -4.157 -5.976
iem
−1 0.72 13.9 i
us
−1 0.926 36.63
piem 0.19 3.68 pius -0.005 -0.036
y¯em 0.07 4.25 y¯us 0.057 6.743
ius
−1 -0.00 -0.15 i
em -0.028 -0.602
pius 0.44 2.66 RESID1 0.004 0.043
y¯us 0.05 4.16
R¯2 0.96 R¯2 0.98
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A.2 Data Sources
Time series for the Euro area
Series Source Description
short-term interest rate European Weighted rate for the overnight maturity,
Central Bank calculated by collecting data on unsecured
overnight lending in the euro area provided
by banks belonging to the EONIA panel;
Interbank deposit bid rates to December 1998,
from January 1999 euro overnight index average
industrial production Eurostat EU11/12; volume index;
not seasonally adjusted
consumer price index Eurostat EU11/12 consumer price index all items
(harmonized);
not seasonally adjusted; index
money growth Deutsche Monetary aggregate M3;
Bundesbank seasonal adjusted;
annual change; EWU
exchange rate OECD EU11/12; real effective exchange rate; index
long-term interest rate European EU11/12 government bond yield - 10 years;
Central Bank percentage
Time series for the U.S.
Series Source Description
short-term interest rate OECD US federal funds rate; percentage
rate of capacity OECD US Business Survey -
utilization seasonally adjusted; percentage
consumer price index U.S. Department of Labor, Consumer Price Index
Bureau of Labor Statistics - All Urban Consumers;
U.S. city average; all items less
food and energy
monetary aggregate Eurostat money supply M2; not
seasonally adjusted; percentage
exchange rate OECD real effective exchange rate; index
long-term interest rate OECD government composite bond yield -
10-year; percentage
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A.3 Unit root tests
Interest rates
ZINS EM ZINS US
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test statistic 0.524728 0.445051
Asymptotic critical values* 1% level 0.739
5% level 0.463
10% level 0.347
* Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (1992, Table 1)
Inflation rates
D CPI EM D CPIC US
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -1.615524 -1.748349
Asymptotic critical values* 1% level -3.505595
5% level -2.894332
10% level -2.584325
* MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
D CPI EM D CPIC US
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test statistic 0.265965 0.261388
Asymptotic critical values* 1% level 0.739 0.216
5% level 0.463 0.146
10% level 0.347 0.119
* Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (1992, Table 1)
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Output gap
CAPA EM CAPA US
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -4.080697 0.233186
Asymptotic critical values* 1% level -2.590910 -3.504727
5% level -1.944445 -2.893956
10% level -1.614392 -2.584126
* MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
CAPA US
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test statistic 0.869627
Asymptotic critical values* 1% level 0.739
5% level 0.463
10% level 0.347
* Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (1992, Table 1)
Exchange rate change
D ER EM D ER US
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test statistic 0.143638 0.154522
Asymptotic critical values* 1% level 0.739
5% level 0.463
10% level 0.347
* Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (1992, Table 1)
Money Growth
D M3 EM D M2 US
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test statistic 0.072102 0.141294
Asymptotic critical values* 1% level 0.216
5% level 0.146
10% level 0.119
* Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (1992, Table 1)
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A.4 Estimations
Basic equation 1995:02 2002:06, backward-looking specification
Euro area US
coefficient t-value coefficient t-value1
dependent variable ∆i
constant*DUM95 0.31 1.84 -7.62 -2.57
constant*DUM99 0.52 2.72 -8.21 -3.29
i
−1*DUM95 -0.22 -3.05 -0.18 -1.67
i
−1*DUM99 -0.15 -2.22 -0.15 -3.75
pi
−1*DUM95 0.36 2.91 0.04 0.52
pi
−1*DUM99 0.00 0.09 0.22 1.76
y¯
−1*DUM95 0.09 3.44 0.10 2.63
y¯
−1*DUM99 0.09 2.90 0.10 3.43
∆i
−1*DUM95 -0.15 -1.27 - -
∆i
−1*DUM99 - - 0.33 2.41
R¯2 0.17 0.58
1 Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=3)
Exchange rate change 1995:02 2002:06, backward-looking speci-
fication
Euro area US
coefficient t-value1 coefficient t-value
dependent variable ∆i
constant*DUM95 0.33 2.73 -8.277 -3.99
constant*DUM99 0.12 0.78 -9.103 -3.69
i
−1*DUM95 -0.22 -3.67 -0.192 -2.13
i
−1*DUM99 -0.05 -1.03 -0.182 -3.65
pi
−1*DUM95 0.36 3.05 0.111 0.99
pi
−1*DUM99 -0.01 -0.25 0.195 1.28
y¯
−1*DUM95 0.10 3.57 0.109 4.23
y¯
−1*DUM99 0.03 1.13 0.120 3.77
∆e
−1*DUM95 0.00 0.23 0.005 0.74
∆e
−1*DUM99 -0.02 -3.86 0.008 0.65
∆i
−1*DUM95 -0.15 -1.11 - -
∆i
−1*DUM99 -0.33 -2.13 0.330 2.78
R¯2 0.28 0.57
1 Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=3)
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Money growth 1995:02 2002:06, backward-looking specification
Euro area US
coefficient t-value coefficient t-value
dependent variable ∆i
constant*DUM95 1.04 3.57 0.55 0.13
constant*DUM99 1.09 3.41 -10.1 -5.85
i
−1*DUM95 -0.31 -4.22 -0.25 -2.85
i
−1*DUM99 -0.25 -3.19 -0.26 -7.43
pi
−1*DUM95 0.45 3.81 -0.24 -1.68
pi
−1*DUM99 0.11 1.34 0.31 2.26
y¯
−1*DUM95 0.08 3.12 0.02 0.50
y¯
−1*DUM99 0.07 2.56 0.14 7.14
∆M
−1*DUM95 -0.10 -2.97 -0.06 -2.25
∆M
−1*DUM99 -0.07 -2.14 -0.09 -3.72
∆i
−1*DUM95 -0.23 -2.00 - -
∆i
−1*DUM99 - - - -
R¯2 0.27 0.62
Foreign interest rate 1995:02 2002:06, backward-looking specifi-
cation
Euro area US
coefficient t-value1 coefficient t-value1
dependent variable ∆i
constant*DUM95 -1.53 -1.95 -6.17 -1.97
constant*DUM99 0.22 1.22 -8.80 -2.84
i
−1*DUM95 -0.32 -4.86 -0.27 -2.23
i
−1*DUM99 -0.22 -4.97 -0.18 -2.61
pi
−1*DUM95 0.42 3.79 -0.14 -0.94
pi
−1*DUM99 0.14 2.23 0.17 1.12
y¯
−1*DUM95 0.06 1.77 0.09 2.36
y¯
−1*DUM99 0.05 1.43 0.11 2.82
i#
−1*DUM95 0.39 2.38 0.08 1.68
i#
−1*DUM99 0.06 3.14 0.03 0.52
∆i
−1*DUM95 -0.12 -0.87 - -
∆i
−1*DUM99 - - 0.33 2.49
R¯2 0.26 0.58
1 Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=3)
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Basic equation 1995:07 1998:12, forward-looking specification
The following equations are all estimated with TSLS. Instrument list: con-
stant, interest rate, inflation rate, output gap, term structure and exchange
rate change with lag 1 to 6, additionally in equations containing money
growth and the foreign interest rate the respective series with lag 1 to 6.
Euro area US
coefficient t-value coefficient t-value
dependent variable ∆i
constant 0.46 2.47 -5.31 -2.61
i
−1 -0.23 -3.28 -0.14 -1.67
pi 0.29 2.54 0.03 0.53
y¯ 0.07 2.12 0.07 2.88
∆i
−1 -0.33 -2.32 - -
R¯2 0.23 0.11
Exchange rate change 1995:07 1998:12, forward-looking specifi-
cation
Euro area US
coefficient t-value coefficient t-value
dependent variable ∆i
constant 0.47 2.09 -6.47 -3.47
i
−1 -0.23 -2.71 -0.19 -2.46
pi 0.30 2.20 0.26 2.75
y¯ 0.07 2.03 0.08 3.60
∆e 0.00 0.03 0.02 3.19
∆i
−1 -0.33 -2.23 - -
R¯2 0.21 0.28
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Money growth 1995:07 1998:12, forward-looking specification
Euro area US
coefficient t-value coefficient t-value1
dependent variable ∆i
constant 0.86 3.00 0.76 0.16
i
−1 -0.25 -3.53 -0.16 -2.13
pi 0.32 2.77 -0.16 -1.01
y¯ 0.06 2.03 0.01 0.19
∆M -0.07 -1.86 -0.05 -1.47
∆i
−1 -0.35 -2.53 - -
R¯2 0.28 0.15
1 Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=3)
Foreign interest rate 1995:07 1998:12, forward-looking specifica-
tion
Euro area US
coefficient t-value coefficient t-value
dependent variable ∆i
constant -1.16 -1.19 -4.50 -1.97
i
−1 -0.27 -3.82 -0.17 -1.54
pi 0.26 2.41 -0.03 -0.23
y¯ 0.02 0.57 0.06 2.50
i# 0.33 1.69 0.03 0.49
∆i
−1 -0.34 -2.49 - -
R¯2 0.31 0.09
Basic equation 1999:07 2002:08, forward-looking specification
Euro area US
coefficient t-value coefficient t-value1
dependent variable ∆i
constant 0.58 3.55 -8.88 -3.56
i
−1 -0.19 -3.43 -0.15 -3.89
pi 0.04 0.70 0.35 2.37
y¯ 0.12 3.92 0.11 3.69
∆i
−1 - - 0.31 2.23
R¯2 0.20 0.70
1 Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=3)
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Exchange rate change 1999:07 2002:08, forward-looking specifi-
cation
Euro area US
coefficient t-value coefficient t-value
dependent variable ∆i
constant 0.34 1.92 -9.89 -4.90
i
−1 -0.13 -2.23 -0.19 -4.68
pi 0.04 0.62 0.26 1.61
y¯ 0.07 2.30 0.12 5.08
∆e -0.01 -2.46 0.01 1.39
∆i
−1 - - 0.33 2.81
R¯2 0.33 0.72
Money growth 1999:07 2002:08, forward-looking specification
Euro area US
coefficient t-value1 coefficient t-value
dependent variable ∆i
constant 1.06 4.94 -8.84 -5.50
i
−1 -0.27 -5.06 -0.20 -7.44
pi 0.17 2.41 0.35 2.63
y¯ 0.07 3.22 0.12 6.79
∆M -0.07 -3.35 -0.08 -4.00
∆i
−1 - - - -
R¯2 0.35 0.76
1 Newey-West HAC Standard Errors & Covariance (lag truncation=3)
Foreign interest rate 1999:07 2002:08, forward-looking specifica-
tion
Euro area US
coefficient t-value coefficient t-value
dependent variable ∆i
constant 0.32 1.85 -10.4 -4.90
i
−1 -0.22 -4.42 -0.21 -4.34
pi 0.14 2.00 0.17 0.94
y¯ 0.08 2.79 0.13 5.01
i# 0.04 2.77 0.11 1.54
∆i
−1 - - 0.26 2.15
R¯2 0.37 0.72
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Figure 1: The short-term interest rate b and the interest rate calculated from the basic Taylor rule
i∗ = pi + 0.5y¯ + 0.5(pi − 2) + 2 = 1.5pi + 0.5y¯ + 1 for the Euro area from 1995:1 to 2002:06.
Figure 2: The federal funds rate and the interest rate calculated from the basic Taylor rule i∗ =
pi + 0.5y¯ + 0.5(pi − 2) + 2 = 1.5pi + 0.5y¯ + 1 for the US from 1995:1 to 2002:6.
aWeighted rate for the overnight maturity, calculated by collecting data on unsecured overnight lending
in the euro area provided by banks belonging to the EONIA panel. Source: ECB (Interbank deposit bid
rates to December 1998, from January 1999 euro overnight index average (EONIA))
bWeighted rate for the overnight maturity, calculated by collecting data on unsecured overnight lending
in the euro area provided by banks belonging to the EONIA panel. Source: ECB (Interbank deposit bid
rates to December 1998, from January 1999 euro overnight index average (EONIA))
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